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APPENDIX B TO INCLOSURE 1

SUBJECT: AFTER ACTION REPORT - Battle of An Tinh

1. (U) OPERATION: HERSHING I
2. (U) PERIOD COVERED: ~~02-04~~ January 1968
3. (U) LOCATION: AN TINH (H), MY THUNG (V), THU MY (D), BINH DINH (F), REPUBLIC OF VIETNAM (BR 997831)
4. (U) COMMAND HEADQUARTERS: 1ST BATTALION (MECH) 50TH INFANTRY, 2D BRIGADE, 1ST AIR CAVALRY DIVISION
5. (U) REPORTING OFFICER: CAPTAIN JOHN A. TOPPER
6. (C) TASK ORGANIZATION:
 - a. B Co 1/50 Infantry
 - b. D Co 1/50 Infantry
 - c. B Co 1/5 Cavalry
 - d. C Co 1/5 Cavalry
 - e. B Co 2/5 Cavalry
7. (C) SUPPORTING FORCES
 - a. C Troop 1/9 Cav (GS)
 - b. 2/20 Arty (ARV) (GS)
 - c. E Btry 7/13 Arty (105) (DS)
 - d. B Btry 7/15 Arty (8") (GS)
 - e. 2d Brigade Aviation Platoon (GS)
 - f. B Co 227th Aviation Battalion (GS)
 - g. 7th Air Force (TAGAIR) (GS)
 - h. 15th Med Bn (GS)
 - i. B Co 8th Engr Bn (GS)
 - j. MIF-A (105) (GS)
 - k. National Police Field Forces (GS)
 - l. Naval Swift Boats (GS)

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8. (C) INTELLIGENCE

Villagers to the west of An Tinh reported that on 1 January an NVA Battalion was seen moving to the east and north. The battalion's mission was reportedly to prepare for the Winter/Spring offensive. Specific mission was believed to be to attack fire bases along highway #1 and also to attack RF/PF outposts.

9. (C) MISSION: Find and destroy the enemy battalion.
10. (C) CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS: D 1/50 is to conduct Cordon & Search of An Lac (1) and (2). B 1/50 is to conduct Search & Clear operations in the Southern Cay Giep mountains.

11. (C) EXECUTION:

a. D 1/50 at 1032 hours on 2 January while moving into An Lac (1), received a heavy volume of small arms and automatic weapons fire from that hamlet and the hamlet immediately bordering it on the north (An Tinh). It became apparent D Company was in contact with a major force. At 1051 hours it was decided to commit B 1/50 which was working about 8,000 meters NW of the contact area. D Company continued in contact. ARVN ships were called in and received extremely heavy volumes of fire. At 1203 hours, D Company succeeded in breaking contact and artillery ceased. The local populace was then given 30 minutes to clear the contact area. At 1237 hours B 1/5 Cav was air-assaulted into the contact area to the south. National Police Field Forces were brought into the area to screen and control the civilians. At 1302 hours D 1/50 and E 1/5 began moving into the contact area supported by tube artillery, ARVN and C 1/9 Cav gun ships. At 1410 hours C 1/5 was air assaulted into the area of contact on the west. At 1430 hours B 1/50 closed the contact area from the north. The enemy was then surrounded and all elements began closing in. Tac Air was called in and tube artillery continued pounding the area. The attack was met with fierce resistance and the Task Force was unable to sweep the entire contact area. At 1537 hours B 1/50 captured a PW who revealed two companies of the 97th Bn, 2d VC Regt, 3d NVA Div and one rear services Co of the 2d Regt were trapped in the hamlet. At night fall all units pulled back and established blocking and ambush positions on routes of enemy egress. At 1657 hours B 2/5 Cav was air assaulted in to further bolster the cordon. Sporadic contact was made with small groups of NVA throughout the night, trying to exfiltrate the contact area.

b. On 3 January C 1/5 followed B 1/50 attacking from the north, D 1/50 attacked from the east and E 1/5 attacked from the south. B 2/5 remained in position as reserve. All units met with sporadic, light to heavy contact throughout the morning. Air strikes and artillery continued. By 1300 hours the last pocket of resistance had been eliminated. Police of the battle area then began and B 2/5 returned to parental control. Though the battle had ended, B 1/50 and C 1/5 remained in the contact area through 4 January digging through the demolished bunkers and fortified positions recovering enemy bodies and weapons. Total body count for the operation was 103 with 28 weapons captured. US losses were six killed and 28 wounded.

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12. (C) REPORTING OFFICER'S ANALYSIS: The battle of An Tinh is significant in that it was preceded by an agent intelligence report, the first of many such reports that proved to be accurate resulting in highly successful operations against the enemy in this area of operations. Also of significance was the highly effective use of Civil Affairs in this action. The battle took place in a heavily populated area. The Task Force Commander, cognizant of the importance of Revolutionary Development quickly realized the program could easily be jeopardized were action to the contrary not taken. Consequently he pulled back all elements as soon as feasibly possible in order to evacuate the area of civilians. This was accomplished with a minimum expenditure of time and under the circumstances, little confusion. As a result many innocent lives were spared. Another significant aspect of the action was the realization that the enemy was entrenched in well-fortified positions. With this in mind the decision was reached to bring in reinforcing ground troops to encircle the area and then make maximum use of tube and aerial rocket artillery as well as tactical air. This proved to be most effective and I'm sure extremely demoralizing to the enemy troops. This is borne out by the degree of extreme shock three prisoners were in when captured. Without this tremendous supporting firepower I'm sure friendly casualties would have been greatly increased. This highly successful victory was realized because of the extremely professional and competent support offered by all elements involved. Should one of these elements been missing the operation would not have been as successful and not nearly so complete.

John A. Tuffer


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
SKETCH MAP - BATTLE OF AN TINH

2 JAN 68



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SKETCH MAP - 3 JAN 68



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