Department of the Army: Vietnam Studies.
Airmobility, 1961-1971.
Part 16, The "Cobra" Arrives
By LTG John J Tolson
Editor's Note: LTG Tolson's discusses the 1/50 (M)
in the Battle of Tam Quan
On 1 September 1967, the first Huey Cobra (AH-1G) arrived
in Vietnam. The initial six aircraft were assigned to their New Equipment
Training Team, under the supervision of the 1st Aviation Brigade. Cobra
New Equipment Training Team training started on 18 September with pilot
transition courses and instruction on air frame, engine, armament and
avionics maintenance. The Cobra was a major step forward in the development
of the armed helicopter. For those pilots who had been flying the old,
make-shift UH-1C's, it was a giant step.
After all this time there were many people, both in and
out of the military, who didn't understand the role of the armed helicopter.
Ever since Colonel Jay D. Vanderpool had tied a machine gun on a H-13
in the mid-50's, there were those who saw the armed helicopter as a
fragile toy dreamed up by frustrated fighter pilots in the Army who
were unable by regulation and budget to own really sophisticated attack
aircraft. The consensus was generally that a semi-skilled skeet shooter
or even a good slingshot artist could knock any helicopter out of the
sky at short range and that an encounter with more sophisticated antiaircraft
weapons would be suicidal. This attitude is quite understandable in
duck hunters who never had the challenge of ducks shooting back. Also,
the very nature of the helicopter, which looks very ugly and fragile
compared to a sleek jet aircraft, adds to the conviction that flying
one in combat is non-habit forming.
On the plus side, the helicopter is the most agile of
all aircraft and has a capability of taking advantage of cover and concealment
at extremely low altitudes that would be impossible in a fixed-wing
airplane. It was soon proven that the helicopter was remarkably hard
to shoot down and the most vulnerable part was the pilot himself. Personnel
armor protection and armored seats greatly increased the pilot survivability.
The experienced pilot used every unique aspect of the helicopter's flight
envelope to his advantage.
Observation from the helicopter is unequaled. The enemy
learned that to fire at one was to give up his advantage of cover and
concealment and generally bring a devastating return of machine gun
fire and rockets. A corollary to the advantage of seeing the enemy was
the ability to identify our own troops with precision. Consequently,
the armed helicopter pilot could safely place fires within a few meters
of our own troops. This became particularly important as the enemy developed
the "hugging" tactics which he used to avoid the heavier fires
from our tactical air support and B-52 bombers.
The Army had long realized that the Huey-gun-rocket combination
was a make-shift, albeit, quite ingenious, system that should be replaced
by a new aircraft specifically designed for the armed mission. In the
early 1960's, industry asserted that advance was within the state of
the art. Experts in research and development urged the Army planners
to go for a compound helicopter with an integrated armament system as
soon as possible. They argued that it was technically feasible and procurement
of any "interim" system would mean the Army would be stuck
with an inferior capability for years to come. Moreover, it appeared
that an advanced system could be procured almost as soon as an interim
aircraft.
There were other pressures too. The Office of the Secretary
of Defense had been critical of all the Services in their efforts to
procure expensive weapon systems that appeared to offer only marginal
improvements over the system they were to replace aircraft that flew
a little higher or faster, tanks that had only slightly better performance,
ships that cruised but a few knots faster. Ever since the Howze Board,
the Army was sensitive to any criticism that it was striving for less
than the best in airmobility. Also, the Air Force maintained that much
of Army aviation duplicated an Air Force capability rather than, as
the Army claimed, complemented Air Force support. The Army decided that
its best option was to hold a design competition for a totally new system
that would offer unique capabilities.
Unfortunately, what was a straight forward concept for
a new armed helicopter soon became bogged down in a morass of permutations,
modifications and additions to its design. The technicians had taken
over from the tacticians. The concept grew in complexity and cost. Worse,
it was being pushed into a later time frame when it was sorely needed
in combat. Such things as a rigid rotor, ground avoidance radar, inertial
navigation and computerization were straining the state of the art and
pricing the Army out of mass production. A reevaluation was inevitable.
Bell Helicopter Company had prudently carried on its own
research and development program using proven dynamic components of
the Huey. Consequently, they were able to offer, at the appropriate
moment, an "off-the-shelf" armed helicopter for just slightly
more than the modified UH-1 that the Army was then buying to replace
Vietnam attrition. The "Cobra" had enough speed to meet the
escort mission; tandem seating; better armour; and a better weapons
system. With the strong urging of the combat commanders, the Army decided
to procure an interim" system for immediate requirements while
it sorted out the problems of the "ultimate" system.
DECCA
The history of the use, lack-of-use, and misuse of DECCA
has many important lessons for future developers of airmobile equipment.
It was recognized by the earliest planners that one of
the limitations of the airmobility concept would be operating at night
and under periods of extreme low visibility. Research and Development
offered many possible options to improve the helicopter's capability
under these conditions, but all were expensive and complex.
The British had perfected a low-level radio navigational
aid known as DECCA which essentially used three low frequency ground
radio stations to propagate a series of hyperbolic curves which could
be translated by a cockpit instrument into a position fix. Accuracy
depended on the spread of the stations, the distance from the station,
and the weather conditions. Because of the low frequency, one of the
attractive features was its low altitude capability. This contrasted
to the line-of-sight limitation of omnidirectional radio navigation
aid and Tactical Air Navigation used by the Air Force. The Army tested
several versions of the DECCA System and decided it had enough advantages
to warrant its installation on command helicopters and lead aircraft.
A DECCA chain had been installed in Vietnam and in the
early 1960's, the Army took over its supervision and maintenance. A
big disadvantage in the DECCA system was the requirement for special
maps printed with the hyperbolic grid and a reluctance by the user to
take the time and effort to develop confidence in the system. Its use
was further complicated by the resistance of the Air Force to accept
a position report in instrument weather from a DECCA read-out as a positive
fix. Many senior officers were dissatisfied with the accuracy and reliability
of the DECCA system at night and eventually the DECCA died from lack
of use and misuse. The requirement for a secure, accurate means of low-level
navigation remained.
"Fire Brigades" Sent North
On 28 September the 1st Cavalry Division was notified
that an increasing enemy buildup in the I Corps Tactical Zone might
require that the III Marine Amphibious Force be reinforced. The 1st
Cavalry was alerted to prepare one brigade. The brigade began movement
on 1 October as the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry and the 3d Brigade command
post departed for Chu Lai. By that evening the 3d Brigade command post,
the 2d Battalion, 12th Cavalry, B Company of the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry
and C Battery of the 1st Battalion, 77th Artillery were closed and the
Brigade was under operational control of the Americal Division.
By 3 October all Brigade elements were in place and Operation
WALLOWA began the next day with a series of air assaults. This deployment
also involved the first major move of significant maintenance elements
from An Khe to Chu Lai. This experience would prove to be extremely
valuable in later operations in the I Corps Tactical Zone.
The concept of a brigade task force, in the U. S. Army's
current division organization, is such that different battalions can
be used under any brigade controlling headquarters. This allows a great
deal of flexibility. For example, the 3d Brigade which had been deployed
to the Dak To area and returned to the PERSHING area of operations had
different battalions when it deployed to Chu Lai. During November we-were
alerted to move another brigade back to the Kontum-Dak To area. This
time I elected that the 1st Brigade headquarters under Colonel Rattan
would control the task force.
The second battle of Dak To, under operational control
of the 4th Division, has been extensively documented elsewhere. For
the purpose of this study, it is important to note that the helicopters
of the 4th Infantry Division, the 173d Airborne Brigade, the 52d Aviation
Battalion, and the 1st Cavalry Division flew in excess of 10,000 hours
in support of the battle. Over 22,000 sorties were flown, transporting
40,000 passengers and 6,000 tons of cargo. Dak To was another example
of the flexibility of an airmobile division which allows its assets
to be parcelled out as rapid reaction forces and still continues on
a basic mission of its own. The large PERSHING area of operation was
left with only one thin brigade during this period. I was glad we had
spent so much time working with the 22d Army of the Republic of Vietnam
Division on airmobile tactics, since the 22d, under the able leadership
of Colonel Nguyen Van Hieu, would have to bear the major burden in Binh
Dinh Province for a time.
Operation Pershing Continues
During the long period of the Binh Dinh operations, the
1st Cavalry Division had developed a special rapport with the regiments
of the 22d Army of the Republic of Vietnam Infantry Division. The Army
of the Republic of Vietnam regiments were assigned distinct areas of
operation contiguous to the 1st Cavalry brigade areas and, teamed with
1st Cavalry helicopters, they became well versed in the intricacies
of airmobile assaults. During Operation PERSHING over 209 joint operations
were conducted with the 22d Army of the Republic of Vietnam Infantry
Division. The 40th Regiment of this division played a major part in
the Battle of Tam Quan.
Back in May 1967, the Division's capabilities had been
greatly enhanced by the attachment of three companies from the 816th
National Police Field Force. Introduction of the National Police Field
Force into the PERSHING area of operations brought a new weapon to bear
on the Viet Cong infrastructure. Now, the Division could conduct cordon
and search operations of hamlets and villages with greatly increased
effectiveness. The National Police Field Force squads were very important
to 1st Cavalry operations in the Binh Dinh Province.
Tam Quan
The Battle of Tam Quan, 6 December to 20 December 1967,
which was one of the largest battles during Operation PERSHING, was
a good example of the "piling on" tactics which had been so
successful in the early airmobile reactions to the enemy. The battle
began with the fortuitous discovery of an enemy radio antenna by a scout
team near the town of Tam Quart and a small force was inserted at 1630
hours on 6 December. Although the original enemy contact had been late
in the day, the 1st Brigade reacted by "piling on" with a
battalion of infantry and elements of the 1st Battalion, 50th Mechanized
Infantry. On the following day, elements of the 40th Army of the Republic
of Vietnam Regiment joined the fight and distinguished themselves by
their aggressive manner. Throughout the battle, which was characterized
by massive use of artillery, tactical air support, and air assaults
by both the U.S. and Army of the Republic of Vietnam troops, the allied
force held the initiative. There were frequent vicious hand-to-hand
battles in the trenches and bunkers. The division used its mechanized
forces to fix the enemy and drive him from his fortified positions.
The airmobile units hit him when he tried to move. The enemy lost 650
men during this fierce engagement.
The Battle of Tam Quan had a much greater significance
than we realized at the time. In that area, it pre-empted the enemy's
Tet offensive even though the full impact wasn't then realized. As a
result, that part of Binh Dinh Was the least effected of any part of
South Vietnam during Tet.
1967 Draws to a Close
During the late fall of 1967, plans had been developed
which would have a tremendous effect on the future of the 1st Cavalry
operations during the next year. U. S. Army, Vietnam, Headquarters,
for the first time in the war, had been given the mission of contingency
planning. They began planning four contingencies which would project
the 1st Cavalry Division into the I Corps Tactical Zone. I the Cavalry
Would go north of Kontum and Pleiku . . . way north of Dak To; II the
Cavalry would go up near Khe Sanh; III to Ashau; and IV the Cavalry
would go into the big supply area west of Quang Ngai. The plans themselves,
known as the YORK Series, are incidental but, like many contingency
plans, they made the U. S. forces examine potential logistical bases,
without which the plans were meaningless. The Marines were told to start
working on Red Beach north of Da Nang as a logistical base to support
the Cavalry in this series of operations. A smaller logistical base
was to be set up at Hue-Phu Bai. Events were soon to prove that the
logic behind this planning effort by U. S. Army, Vietnam, was indisputably
sound.
The year 1967 had proved many important facets of the
airmobile concept. Perhaps the most important facet that had been demonstrated
without question was the inestimable value of the Air Cavalry squadron.
This unit, especially in its operations in the I Corps Tactical Zone,
had demonstrated its unique capabilities in uncovering the elusive Viet
Cong. Practically every major engagement was started with a contact
by the 1st Squadron, 9th Cavalry Troop, and the enemy was very slow
in discovering means of coping with this reconnaissance in force.
The Air Cavalry squadron success in the airmobile division
convinced higher headquarters that more Air Cavalry squadrons should
be assigned to the theater to work with non-airmobile divisions. In
my briefings to the many senior officers who visited the Cavalry Division,
I never missed an opportunity to state that no matter what kind of a
division I might be privileged to command in combat, I would fight tooth
and nail for the capability of an Air Cavalry squadron.
US ARMY